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Outline of topics
◮ Agent-based Macroeconomics
◮ Leverage cycle – Geneakoplos
◮ Financial Instability Hypothesis – Minsky
◮ Basel III and the procyclicality of capital adequacy requirements
◮ Macro-prudential banking regulation
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Motivations for Agent-based Macroeconomics with Integrated Finance
1. ”Nobody has got something so convincing that the mainstream has to
put up its hands and surrender” (Paul Ormerod 2013)
2. ”No model yet produces the frequent small recessions, punctuated by
rare depressions, seen in reality.” (The Economist 2013)
3. ”Macroeconomics without the financial cycle is like Hamlet without the
Prince. [...] it is simply not possible to understand business fluctuations
and their policy challenges without understanding the financial cycle.”
(Claudio Borio, 2012)
4. ”The structure of an economic model that is relevant to a capitalist
economy needs to include the interrelated balance sheets and income
statements of the units of the economy.” Hyman Minsky (1996)
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Empirical Motivations
Features of macroeconomics with a financial cycle (Borio, 2012):
◮ the financial boom should not just precede the bust but cause it (a` la
Minsky).
◮ the presence of debt and capital stock overhangs (excess stocks,
non-full utilization rates).
Findings:
◮ Recessions following a crisis after a fragile boom tend to have much
larger declines in consumption, investment, output, and employment.
(Shularick & Taylor, 2012)
◮ Balance sheet recessions: Recessions driven by deleveraging lead to a
prolonged slump. (Koo, 2011)
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Balance sheets
Firm
Assets Liabilities
Cash Debt
+ revenue-wages + new loans
+ interest deposits - principle
+ new loans - bad debt
- interest debt
- principle
- taxes
- dividends
Inventory
+ output - sales
Capital stock Equity
+ investment +profits
+bad debt
Bank
Assets Liabilities
Cash reserves Deposits
- interest deposits +/- withdrawals
+ interest debt + new loans
- taxes - principledepositors
- dividends
+ principlecreditors
- principledepositors
Loans ECB debt
+ new loans +/- liquidity
- principlecreditors +/- interest
- bad debt
Equity
+profits
- bad debt
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Balance sheets (Firm)
Assets Liabilities
Mi : liquidity Di,b : debts to banks
+piRi +Loani,b
−wiLi − pv Ivi − Ti −
P
b ∆Di,b
+Loani,b −BDi
−
P
b ∆Di,b
+rbMi −
P
b r
bLoani,b
−diNi
Invi : value of local inventory stock Ei : equity
−piRi pii = piRi − wiLi − pv Ivi − Ti − diNi
+piQi +rbMi −
P
b r
bLoani,b
Ki : value of capital stock +BDi
+pv Ivi
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Fragility
Financial instability hypothesis
Financial cycle mechanisms
Financial accelerator amplifies business cycles (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988):
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Financial accelerator amplifies business cycles (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988):
1. Borrowers balance sheet channel
◮ Changes in the value of assets on the balance sheet of firms affect the
ability to borrow
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Financial cycle mechanisms
Financial accelerator amplifies business cycles (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988):
1. Borrowers balance sheet channel
◮ Changes in the value of assets on the balance sheet of firms affect the
ability to borrow
2. Bank lending channel
◮ Changes in the value of assets on the balance sheet of a bank affects the
bank’s ability to lend
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Scenario: A Credit Crunch
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The road to Financial Fragility
Relationship between over-endebtedness of firms and bank’s
willingness to lend: Credit bubble and deleveraging crash
Total debt firms Bank activity Firm insolvency/illiquidity
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Financial Instability Hypothesis
◮ Equity/Asset-ratio: Measure for financial robustness
◮ Fragility synchronized with business cycle? (Fragile booms, deleveraging
recovery)
Output and E/A ratio
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Research questions (Policy)
Can the credit crunch be avoided by stricter banking regulations?
Instruments available to Central Banks to regulate commercial banks’
financing
◮ Capital adequacy requirement: constrain exposure risk
◮ Reserve requirement: regulate the liquidity
◮ Lender-of-last resort: CB provides emergency liquidity to banks with low
reserves
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Bank regulation (I): Capital requirement
1. Firm prob. of default
probdefi = 1− e−0.1Di,t/Ei,t
2. Interest rate offered by bank b to firm i
rbi = r
ECB
“
1 + λB(1− e−0.1Di,t/Ei,t ) + U[0,1]
”
λB = 3: penalty rate for high-risk firm
3. Risk-weighted credit (expected loss at default) for a single loan
CRi =
“
1− e−0.1Di,t/Ei,t
”
· Loani,t
4. Minimal capital requirement (Basel II): risk-weighted assets
CRtotb ≤ αEb (1)
α: max. risk-weighted leverage ratio (∼ 10)
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Bank regulation (II): Cash Reserve requirement
◮ Liquidity constraint: minimal cash reserve requirement
Mb ≥ β(
X
h∈H
Mbh +
X
i∈F
Mbi )
⇒ Possibility of credit rationing:
◮ Illiquid banks stop lending to all firms (bank lending channel)
◮ Risky firms cannot get loans (borrower’s balance sheet channel)
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Scenarios: Bank activity
Number of active banks (unconstrained + constrained by equity/liquidity
constraint)
No constraint Capital constraint (α = 2) Liquidity constraint (β = 0.5)
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Scenarios: Firm activity
Number of illiquid firms
No constraint Capital constraint Liquidity constraint
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Scenarios: Firm Fragility
Firm E/A-ratio
Capital constraint Liquidity constraint Liquidity constraint
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Summary
Limits on excessive risk-taking:
1. Amplitude recessions increases
2. More banks fail
3. More firms go illiquid
◮ constraint does not discriminate
◮ constraint self-reinforcing
4. Steep sudden deleveraging
5. Concentration banking sector
Limits on liquidity:
1. Amplitude recessions decreases
2. Banks stay alive
3. Large firms go illiquid
◮ large firms largest credit demand
◮ liq. constraint helps small firms
4. Gradual deleveraging in waves
5. Bank equity recovers
Sander van der Hoog Bubbles, Crashes & the Financial Cycle
Thank you for your attention!
Model documentation:
http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/vpl1/research/eurace-unibi.html
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Scenario: Capital adequacy constraint
Output Bank activity Firm activity
Bank equity Firm fragility Mean interest
Scenario: Minimum reserve requirement
Output Bank activity Firm activity
Bank equity Firm fragility Mean interest
